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PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: THE FATE OF STRICT LIABILITY UNDER THE 
MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT 
KALYANI ROBBINS* 
The Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) contains a very broad ban on harming migratory 
birds, as well as a strict liability standard for misdemeanor violations. Without further 
limitation, the MBTA would theoretically apply to countless ordinary life activities, such as 
driving a car or having windows on one’s home. Naturally, there are due process concerns with 
such a scenario, so Congress expressly left it to the Department of the Interior to draft more 
detailed implementing regulations. Unfortunately, the existing regulations fail to adequately 
address the potential overbreadth of the MBTA’s misdemeanor application, forcing the courts to 
do so on an ad hoc basis. Such individualized legal analyses create the risk of developing bad 
law as a result of less-than-ideal test cases. This is exactly what took place in United States v. 
Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010), the only appellate case dealing with the 
MBTA’s strict liability standard in the context of industrial harms—the current trend for 
enforcement—in several decades. In that case, the Tenth Circuit applied a “knew or should have 
known” standard to an industrial actor causing bird deaths, holding that criminal liability only 
attaches after the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has directly notified the defendant in writing of 
the danger his equipment presents to birds. This is a terrible case, as it completely writes the 
strict liability standard out of the statute. This Article argues that regulations—or even a written 
enforcement policy—that create prosecutorial limitations to avoid violating due process will 
prevent courts from struggling to cope with the MBTA’s theoretically broad reach, which can 
result in bad law. It sorts through the historical development of strict liability, especially in the 
public welfare offense context, and proposes that those engaged in activities where regulation 
should be foreseen—such as operating oil rigs, as in Apollo Energies—should be held to a 
higher standard than others. This is in line with the Supreme Court case law justifying strict 
liability in the face of due process challenges. Ultimately, the Article concludes that such across-
 2 
the-board line drawing for the MBTA’s strict liability provisions would have prevented the Tenth 
Circuit from deciding Apollo Energies as it did. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Hemisphere solidarity is new among statesmen, but not among the feathered 
navies of the sky. -- Aldo Leopold
1
 
 
I realized that if I had to choose, I would rather have birds than airplanes. -- 
Charles A. Lindbergh
2
 
 
Birds should be saved because of utilitarian reasons; and, moreover, they should 
be saved because of reasons unconnected with any return in dollars and 
cents. . . . [T]o lose the chance to see frigate-birds soaring in circles above the 
storm, or a file of pelicans winging their way homeward across the crimson 
afterglow of the sunset, or a myriad terns flashing in the bright light of midday as 
they hover in a shifting maze above the beach—why, the loss is like the loss of a 
gallery of the masterpieces of the artists of old time. -- Theodore Roosevelt
3
 
 
There is a constant tension in all areas of wildlife regulation. On the one hand is the 
somewhat understandable prioritization of a modern lifestyle and comforts over the protection of 
creatures we barely understand. On the other hand we have our highly disciplined legislative 
choices made long ago, at a time when the political climate and economic needs were somewhat 
different than they are today. Why should a little fish nobody previously knew existed halt 
completion of a major dam project on which millions of dollars have already been spent?
4
 Who 
really cares about some irritating fly when there are so many people crammed into southern 
                                                 
*Associate Professor, University of Akron School of Law. Thanks go to Dan Rohlf for inviting me to write this 
symposium piece, to the faculties at the University of San Francisco School of Law and the University of Akron 
School of Law for their helpful input during draft workshops, and to the amazing bird advocates at the symposium 
presentation whose thoughtful questions brought a more practical perspective to the issues in this paper. 
1
 ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 35 (1949). 
2
 Alden Whitman, Lindbergh Traveling Widely as Conservationist, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1969, at 1, 26 (quoting 
Lindbergh). 
3
 THEODORE ROOSEVELT, A BOOK-LOVER’S HOLIDAYS IN THE OPEN 316–17 (1916). 
4
 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 159, 171–73 (1978) (prohibiting completion of a dam that would 
have eradicated the snail darter, an endangered species, or destroyed its critical habitat). 
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California and desperate for more living space?
5
 Thankfully, with the development of the 
relatively new scientific field of conservation biology, we are beginning to understand the 
importance of keeping every cog in the wheel, but because not everyone is onboard, strict 
protective laws remain essential. 
The focus of this symposium is on migratory birds in particular, so the policy question is 
narrower. To what lengths must we go to avoid harming migratory birds, and how much must be 
sacrificed for each handful of bird deaths prevented? Further, and of particular relevance to this 
Article: how much research must we do, individually and proactively, on the potential risks we 
create for migratory birds? How much can we be expected to anticipate? Are some of us 
burdened with a greater responsibility than others to learn about migratory birds and their habits? 
My answer, which this Article endeavors to support, is that those who present a greater risk than 
that posed by the average member of the public should be held to a higher duty. When it comes 
to commercial activity, regulation is to be expected. The strict liability offenses found in the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA)
6
 should be enforced with the purest form of strict liability 
when dealing with industrial harms. 
Part II of this Article will establish, as a preliminary matter, that there is no remaining 
question that the misdemeanor offenses in the MBTA are to be enforced with strict liability. Part 
III will review strict liability itself in an effort to determine how it is to be applied, both as a 
policy matter and in preserving due process. This Part will follow the progression of the standard 
from its roots into the modern realm of environmental offenses, an area in which it arguably fits 
best. Part IV focuses on a particularly disconcerting recent case out of the Tenth Circuit. The 
criticism contained in the same Part is due both because the case creates bad law and because it 
has arguably taken over the position as the definitive authority on the application of the MBTA’s 
                                                 
5
 See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (affirming the lower court’s 
application of section 9(a)(1) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006 & Supp. IV 
2010), to the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly (Rhaphiomidas terminatus abdominalis); section 9(a)(1) is 16 U.S.C. § 
1538(a)(1) (2006)). 
6
 16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010). Strict liability is addressed in 16 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2006). 
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strict liability standard. Finally, what we can glean from the state of case law in this area is that 
we absolutely must sort through the possible applications of the statute and derive a sensible and 
relatively uniform system to make it work as strongly as possible without offending due process. 
Part V proposes such a plan. 
II. STRICT LIABILITY IS FIRMLY ESTABLISHED FOR MBTA MISDEMEANORS 
While the initial matter of establishing that the MBTA imposes strict liability for its 
misdemeanor offenses is an important one, it is also one that can be achieved quickly. There is 
little controversy on this issue. The MBTA began as a purely strict liability statute, but was later 
amended to add a mens rea requirement for its felony provisions.
7
 It now distinguishes between 
misdemeanors and felonies in its penalty provisions as follows: 
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any person, association, 
partnership, or corporation who shall violate any provisions of said conventions or 
of this subchapter, or who shall violate or fail to comply with any regulation made 
pursuant to this subchapter shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and upon 
conviction thereof shall be fined not more than $15,000 or be imprisoned not 
more than six months, or both. 
(b) Whoever, in violation of this subchapter, shall knowingly— 
(1) take by any manner whatsoever any migratory bird with intent to sell, 
offer to sell, barter or offer to barter such bird, or  
(2) sell, offer for sale, barter or offer to barter, any migratory bird shall be 
guilty of a felony and shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more 
than two years, or both.
8
 
In the 1986 amendments requiring mens rea for felony violations, Congress added the 
above-cited “knowingly” to section 707(b)9 after a case found the felony provisions in the 
MBTA unconstitutional,
10
 even though strict liability felonies had been upheld in other 
contexts.
11
 In response to remaining concerns about strict liability in certain special 
                                                 
7
 United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 686 (10th Cir. 2010).  
8
 16 U.S.C. § 707(a)–(b) (2006) (emphasis added). 
9
 Emergency Wetlands Resources Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-645, § 501, 100 Stat. 3582, 3590 (codified at 16 
U.S.C. § 707(b) (2006)) (providing that the knowledge requirement only goes to the fact that actions constitute sale, 
barter, or offer to sell migratory birds). 
10
 United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121, 1122 (6th Cir. 1985). 
11
 See, e.g., United States v. Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 433–36 (3d Cir. 1986).  
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circumstances, Congress further amended the MBTA to make it unlawful to hunt over baited 
fields where “the person knows or reasonably should know that” he or she is hunting over baited 
fields.
12
 
Throughout the several occasions that Congress amended the mens rea requirements 
under the MBTA, and in spite of the clear trend of such amendments chipping away at strict 
liability, it repeatedly left general misdemeanor violations alone. When adding the term 
“knowingly” to section 707(b), Congress left section 707(a) without it.13 This was no accident, as 
the legislative history of the amendment makes clear: “Nothing in this amendment is intended to 
alter the ‘strict liability’ standard for misdemeanor prosecutions under 16 U.S.C. 707(a), a 
standard which has been upheld in many Federal court decisions.”14 The vast majority of courts 
addressing the issue have upheld strict liability as the correct standard for MBTA 
misdemeanors.
15
 What is less consistent, however, is how to apply this standard. That, of course, 
is the main concern of this Article. 
III. HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND MODERN DEVELOPMENT OF STRICT LIABILITY 
Before we can take a meaningful look at the methods courts are using in applying the 
strict liability standard under the MBTA, it is necessary to understand strict liability in general. It 
is my position that strict liability has recently been applied differently in the MBTA context—
erroneously—so I must begin with a proper investigation into that from which it differs. 
A. Mens Rea 
                                                 
12
 Migratory Bird Treaty Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-312, § 102, 112 Stat. 2956, 2956 (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 704(b)(1) (2006)). 
13
 16 U.S.C. § 707(a)–(b) (2006). 
14
 S. REP. NO. 99-445, at 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6113, 6128. 
15
 See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 311 F.3d 611, 614–16 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 
805 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Smith, 29 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1994); Engler, 806 F.2d at 431; United 
States v. Chandler, 753 F.2d 360, 363 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir. 1984); 
United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir. 1978); Rogers v. United States, 367 F.2d 998, 1001 (8th 
Cir. 1966). C.f. United States v. Wood, 437 F.2d 91, 92 (9th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (affirming the finding that “if 
scienter was an element, the flight of appellants supplied a basis for such an inference”). 
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Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea.
16
 
The association between criminal liability and a guilty mind goes back many centuries—
at least to the thirteenth century and possibly several earlier than that.
17
 Blackstone commented 
that “to constitute a crime against human laws, there must be, first, a vi[c]ious will.”18 Some 
would even say that the mental element has been relevant in criminal law from “time 
immemorial.”19 That said, many historians do not believe that there was always a mental element 
to criminal laws, but rather hold that it was the church that injected this form of morality into 
what had previously been merely about causing harm to society, arguing that the church’s 
addition was in part based on a theory of vengeance.
20
 But from a utilitarian standpoint, which 
arguably is the societally stronger basis for policy, vengeance is of only little value, and only to 
the few who have directly suffered at the criminal’s hands. 
What we need most, in order to be capable of living among so many millions of others 
who are not necessarily concerned with our best interests, is deterrence. Of course, there is a 
place for mens rea in this deterrent ideal. It is easiest to deter that which is done intentionally.
21
 
When an individual has a criminal plan or purpose, and assuming he is among those who are 
capable of weighing the costs and benefits of proceeding with their evil plans, it is quite easy for 
him to combine the variables of punishment and likelihood of capture to weigh against the 
achievement of the wrongful goal.
22
 This cost benefit analysis is at the heart of the deterrent goal 
                                                 
16
 Bruce R. Bryan, The Battle Between Mens Rea and the Public Welfare: United States v. Laughlin Finds a Middle 
Ground, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 157, 159 n.11 (1995) (“[A]n act does not make a person guilty unless his mind is 
guilty[].”). 
17
 See Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: The Rise and Fall of Strict Criminal Liability, 30 B.C. L. 
REV. 337, 338 n.4 (1989). 
18
 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 21 (reprt. 1966). 
19
 Gerhard O. W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Law Without It: Rationale and the West Virginia Rule, 58 W. VA. L. 
REV. 34, 34–35 (1955). 
20
 See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 975 (1932). 
21
 See Philip J. Cook, Research in Criminal Deterrence: Laying the Groundwork for the Second Decade, in 2 CRIME 
AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 211, 216–18 (1980). 
22
 Id. at 216.  
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of criminal law, and is most accessible to those who know that what they are about to do is 
wrong.
23
 
That said, and while we cannot have proper vengeance without mens rea, there will be 
times when certain, otherwise innocent, behaviors will need to be regulated, both to achieve 
uniformity where needed and to reduce the risks the behaviors may create. The question is: can 
deterrence be accomplished without mens rea? It is my position that it can, that some choices 
and involvements come with heightened duties of care, and that ignorance of the risks created is 
itself a behavior that can be deterred. Ignorance is the antithesis of mens rea, but where one is in 
a special position to prevent harm, ignorance of that harm can indeed be deterred. Sometimes 
harms ignorantly caused can be resolved in tort, and such has been the argument that criminal 
punishment should be reserved in this manner for the morally blameworthy.
24
 There are 
nonetheless certain remaining circumstances that require regulation and do not fit neatly into the 
tort system,
25
 suggesting that the rule of mens rea needs to admit some exceptions. 
B. Strict Liability Fills Enforcement Gaps Left by Requirement of Mens Rea 
Many criminal statutes do not specify a mens rea element, but courts will presume it is 
there where the statute codifies a common law offense, as mens rea was so deeply engrained in 
the common law.
26
 However, around the middle of the nineteenth century a new sort of criminal 
law began to develop, one which sought to regulate certain behaviors that may place the public 
welfare at risk, and to do so without regard to fault.
27
 This “strict liability” has historically 
applied to those engaged in a dangerous activity that places them in a position of responsibility to 
                                                 
23
 See id. 216–17. 
24
 See Sayre, supra note 20, at 1003–04. 
25
 See id. 
26
 See United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251–52 (1922) (“[T]he general rule at common law was that the 
scienter was a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every crime, and this was followed in regard to 
statutory crimes even where the statutory definition did not in terms include it . . .”); Colin Manchester, The Origins 
of Strict Criminal Liability, 6 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 277, 277 (1977).  
27
 Manchester, supra note 26, at 277–83 (tracing the emergence of strict liability “regulatory offenses” to the rise of 
the Industrial Revolution in the mid-1800s). 
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the public, such as supplying goods or handling highly dangerous materials.
28
 Such offenses are 
described as “public welfare” offenses, and the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that so-
described offenses are generally the only kind that can be criminalized without requiring proof of 
mens rea.
29
 
Many scholars have battled strenuously against this trend, arguing that the criminalization 
of “morally neutral” actions “dilute[s] the value of the criminal sanction and diminish[es] its 
meaning.”30 They suggest that proponents of strict liability for public welfare offenses are 
making a deal with the devil, trading the moral justification for criminal punishment for the 
convenience of deterring harmful acts that do not stem from a guilty conscience.
31
 There is one 
glaring fallacy in this argument: where there can be deterrence, there is by definition some matter 
of choice, and therefore the existence of fault, even if too subliminal to meet a mens rea standard. 
Where there is choice there is fault, and without choice there is no potential for deterrence.
32
 Just 
as traditional crimes come with a spectrum of mens rea levels—for instance, purposely, 
knowingly, recklessly, and negligently, as we see in the Model Penal Code
33—so too does 
seemingly unintended harm, that which falls below the threshold for negligence. The choices at 
issue merely come earlier in the strict liability context. 
We all make risk-preventative choices every day for ourselves and our families: child 
proofing our home when it houses a toddler, wearing a seatbelt though we have never been in an 
                                                 
28
 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607–09 (1994). 
29
 Id. at 616–19. 
30
 See Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content 
of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1535 (1997) (citing the thread of scholarly criticism addressing 
criminalization of regulatory offenses). 
31
 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Moral Credibility and Crime, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1995, at 72, 77 
(“[C]riminal law is increasingly used against purely regulatory offenses, such as those involving the activities 
permitted in public parks, the maintenance procedures at warehouses, and the foodstuffs that may be imported into a 
state. The move is understandable: reformers seek to enlist the moral force implicit in criminal conviction for the 
sake of deterrence—a force that civil liability does not carry. But the use of criminal conviction in the absence of 
serious criminal harm that deserves moral condemnation weakens that very force. As the label ‘criminal’ is 
increasingly applied to minor violations of a merely civil nature, criminal liability will increasingly become 
indistinct from civil and will lose its particular stigma.”). 
32
 See Green, supra note 30, at 1579, 1591–92 (noting that the choice to act in violation of any law may have 
“significant moral content,” indicating that mere illegality regardless of mens rea may have a deterrent effect). 
33
 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (Official Draft 1985). 
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accident, and locking our front door when we know of no person ever having tried to open it 
uninvited. Most such choices are not required of us, but when our activities interplay with the 
outside world, when we are in a position to protect others from risk, we cannot always be 
counted on to be as naturally protective as we are of ourselves and our families. This is where 
strict liability public welfare offenses can step in to require us to proactively prevent harm—even 
harm that we are not aware is taking place—because we alone are in a position to prevent it. It 
is this special role of sole capability and responsibility, and not mens rea, which forms the 
justification for criminal sanctions when the prohibited and preventable harm takes place. 
C. Strict Liability Is Not Another Name for Negligence 
The modern distillation of mens rea options tends to focus on the concepts of purposely, 
knowingly, recklessly, and negligently.
34
 While there are other mens rea terms in use, these are 
the broad concepts they represent. Negligence is the lowest standard, and generally requires that 
a defendant fail to live up to a duty of which he should have been aware but was not.
35
  When we 
call people negligent we are saying that they should have been more careful, more conscious, 
more proactive and on top of those things over which they have exercised some control, but we 
are not calling them consciously careless, as that would move toward the standard for 
recklessness.
36
 Ultimately, negligence is a very low standard, and one that can easily apply to 
morally innocent people. 
Strict liability, on the other hand, is the complete absence of any mens rea requirement at 
all.  Because it is not negligence, it is not necessary to consider what a reasonable person would 
have done, or known about.  We need not label the defendant careless or unconcerned.  It is guilt 
without moral fault.  It is the person who drives over the speed limit not realizing that their 
speedometer was off by ten miles per hour, which person may well have been the most 
conservative, rule-following driver you have ever met.  It is a rule the legislature has decided is 
                                                 
34
 See id. 
35
 Id. § 2.02(2)(d). 
36
 DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND LAWYERING STRATEGIES 188 (2d ed. 2010).  
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essential that everyone follow universally and without fail, and often one in which there is 
difficulty in proving a mental state.  It is a kind of harm society has determined that you simply 
cannot cause, no matter how innocently.  It is called “strict” for good reason. 
Because strict liability applies regardless of knowledge, foreseeability of the harm itself
41
 
is not an appropriate concern, as that is a concept wedded to the notion of a guilty mind. Of 
course, some act, or omission where there was a duty to act, must still be present, as without an 
actus reus there would be nothing left of a crime. Wholly passive behavior cannot be 
criminalized.
42
 Strict liability is generally the approach taken when a legislature wants to hold 
those who take on a special responsibility to a high standard of care, one that demands the search 
for information about hazards that goes beyond that which they already knew or even should 
have known.
43
 It is not another term for negligence, but rather the complete absence of any mens 
rea at all: “Indeed, the premise of strict liability is that the defendant is held guilty no matter how 
careful and morally innocent he or she, or one for whose acts he or she is responsible, has 
been.”44 
The landmark case defining strict criminal liability is United States v. Balint.
45
 In that 
case the defendant was charged with selling narcotic drugs without a written order, in violation 
of the Narcotic Act of 1914.
46
 Balint demurred to the indictment on the basis that it did not allege 
that he knew the drug he sold was a narcotic drug, and the district court quashed the indictment 
for this reason.
47
 The Supreme Court held that there was no knowledge requirement in the 
                                                 
41
 As opposed to the actor’s general exposure to regulation based upon her involvements and authority. See, e.g., 
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284–85 (1943) (stating that regardless of an actor’s consciousness of 
wrongdoing, Congress has placed the burden of determining risk on those actors—such as the president of a 
company—who have an opportunity to inform themselves, rather than place the risk on the helpless public). 
42
 Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228–30 (1957). 
43
 See Singer, supra note 17, at 389. 
44
 Id. at 356. 
45
 258 U.S. 250 (1922). 
46
 Id. at 251; Act of Dec. 17, 1914, ch. 1, 38 Stat. 785 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C §§ 1040–1054 (1934)). 
47
 Balint, 258 U.S. at 251. 
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statute, as well as no due process violation for its absence, and revived the indictment.
48
 The 
Court pointed out that this trend of criminal statutes without mens rea was necessary to address 
matters in which enforcement may be impeded by such a requirement.
49
 In the pursuit of social 
betterment, those who cause proscribed harm may be punished in spite of their complete 
ignorance as to the facts that caused the harm.
50
 The Balint Court accepted the fact that 
sometimes innocent parties would be convicted, noting that Congress had weighed that concern 
against the harm to be avoided by the statute, factoring in the difficulty involved in proving 
knowledge under the relevant circumstances.
51
 
The classic example used to teach the concept of strict criminal liability is statutory rape, 
which is virtually always a strict liability offense.
52
 Where, for instance, a state legislature has set 
the age of consent for sexual intercourse at sixteen, if a defendant of sufficient age under the 
statute has sex with a fifteen-year-old, he is guilty of the offense regardless of his knowledge of 
her age.
53
 He is guilty in spite of a reasonable belief that she was eighteen. Such belief may be 
based on her own statements, her appearance, even her enrollment in college—it would not 
matter how great the reasons for the belief—he is still guilty of the offense.54 He is given the 
duty to ascertain without fail that the person with whom he engages in sexual activity is old 
enough to consent to that activity.
55
 This is because the protection of youthful innocence has 
                                                 
48
 Id. at 252, 254. 
49
 Id. at 251–52. 
50
 Id. at 252 (noting that the Court in Shevlin-Carpenter “held that in the prohibition or punishment of particular 
acts, the State may in the maintenance of a public policy provide ‘that he who shall do them shall do them at his 
peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance’” (quoting Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. 
Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 69–70 (1910))). 
51
 Id. at 254. 
52
 See Colin Campbell, Annotation, Mistake or Lack of Information as to Victim’s Age as Defense to Statutory Rape, 
46 A.L.R. 5TH 499, 508 (1997). 
53
 See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-65 (West 2011); see also Campbell, supra note 52, at 510–13 (listing states 
that follow the strict liability rule). 
54
 See, e.g., Garnett v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 798–99, 803–04 (Md. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming the exclusion of 
evidence that a mentally retarded man had a reasonable belief that the age difference between the victim and himself 
was within the statutory limit).  
55
 See, e.g., id. at 802–05 (noting that although two-fifths of the states allow a defense of reasonable mistake as to 
the victim’s age, the statutes of the majority of states impose strict liability in cases of statutory rape, placing the risk 
of mistake as to the victim’s age solely on the defendant). 
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outweighed, as a policy matter, his entitlement to act in ignorance. The most famous case 
supporting this long tradition is Regina v. Prince,
56
 from the nineteenth century. This area of 
strict criminal liability likely set the stage for the proliferation of such offenses throughout the 
twentieth century. 
Another classic case demonstrating just how far courts are willing to go in punishing 
without mens rea is State v. Lindberg.
57
 The banking statute at issue in that case provided that 
“[e]very director and officer of any bank . . . who shall borrow . . . any of its funds in an 
excessive amount . . . shall . . . be guilty of a felony.”58 The defendant argued that he could not 
be charged with the offense because not only did he not know the money came from his bank, 
but he had even been assured by the bank official processing the loan that the money came from 
a different bank.
59
 However, the court held that the reasonableness of the defendant’s mistake 
was not a defense because the statute did not require proof of mens rea.
60
 The act of borrowing 
money that in fact came from his own bank was a violation of the statute without regard to his 
lack of knowledge of the key facts making it so.
61
 
If there is no need for culpability, where does guilt come from in the context of strict 
criminal liability? It is sufficient to have authority over the conditions which led to the 
proscribed harm.
62
 Such responsibility encourages one to seek out every possible necessity for 
care, not just those which he knows about or even should have known about—the latter being the 
standard for negligence.
63
 This is not to say that it is simply a higher standard of care, beyond the 
                                                 
56
 (1875) L.R. 2 C.C.R. 154, 175–76 (holding that a defendant’s bona fide and reasonable belief that a girl is older 
than 16 is not a defense against an indictment for unlawfully taking an unmarried girl under the age of 16 from her 
father).  
57
 215 P. 41 (Wash. 1923). 
58
 WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3259 (Remington 1932) (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE §§ 30.12.060–
30.12.070 (2010)). 
59
 Lindberg, 215 P. at 44–45. 
60
 Id. at 45, 47. 
61
 Id.  
62
 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 670–71 (1975). 
63
 See, e.g., id. at 672. 
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reasonable to the extraordinary, as this would still fall within the concept of mens rea.
64
 Rather, 
it is entirely irrelevant whether the defendant should have known, or even should have 
discovered with great effort, that the risk was there.  It is sufficient that the defendant had 
authority over the conditions creating the risk—and ultimately causing the harm—and that 
avoidance of the harm was possible.
65
 While acting with due care to avoid proscribed harms is 
not sufficient to defend against a strict liability charge, it is certainly the sort of behavior such a 
statute encourages, thereby going beyond negligence. 
D. Strict Liability Does Have Limits 
Of course, the leeway to create criminal sanctions without regard to fault is not 
unfettered. There are, as there must be, due process limitations to such a development. In United 
States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp. (International Minerals),
66
 the Supreme 
Court tied the concept of strict criminal liability to the involvement in activities one might expect 
to be regulated, such as when shipping dangerous substances—as was at issue in that case67—or 
selling drugs—as in Balint.68 The Court noted that while “[p]encils, dental floss, [and] paper 
clips may also be regulated,” doing so would raise serious due process concerns absent a mens 
rea requirement.
69
 It is this concept that forms the foundation of my ultimate proposals for 
directing MBTA enforcement.
70
 
In Staples v. United States
71
 the Court was not directly focused on a due process 
violation, but rather construed a firearms regulation as having a mens rea requirement in spite of 
its silence on the matter.
72
 However, the Court did so in an apparent attempt to avoid a due 
                                                 
64
 See Kenneth W. Simons, When Is Strict Criminal Liability Just?, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1075, 1131–33 
(1997) (arguing that strict liability does not entail a duty to use “extraordinary care”). 
65
 See, e.g., Park, 421 U.S. at 671–72, 674. 
66
 402 U.S. 558 (1971). 
67
 Id. at 563–65. 
68
 Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 254 (1922). 
69
 International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564–65. 
70
 See discussion infra Part V. 
71
 511 U.S. 600 (1994). 
72
 Id. at 619. 
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process problem
73
 because the Court focused on two ways of limiting the potential for strict 
criminal liability. First, it considered the International Minerals characterization of strict liability 
regulatory or public welfare offenses as being those in which the defendant is engaged in some 
sort of potentially harmful or injurious activity.
74
 Although the statute at issue in Staples 
regulated automatic weapons, the Court held—but with only five justices agreeing on this 
point—that because gun ownership is so extremely common, an automatic weapon could not 
qualify as a dangerous item one might expect to be regulated.
75
 This position is, not surprisingly, 
highly controversial.
76
 The second basis for the Court’s requirement of mens rea added a 
limitation on the extent of punishment that may be available under a strict liability statute.
77
 
While not ruling out strict liability for felonies—Balint involved a felony with imprisonment of 
up to five years and was not overruled in Staples—the Court held that the ten-year imprisonment 
potential upon conviction under the National Firearms Act
78
 was too severe a punishment for 
                                                 
73
 See International Minerals, 402 U.S. at 564–65 (noting possible due process questions raised if Congress were to 
regulate products that are not “dangerous or deleterious” or “obnoxious waste materials” without requiring a mens 
rea element); see also Alex Arensberg, Note, Are Migratory Birds Extending Environmental Criminal Liability?, 38 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 427, 429–30 (2011) (explaining possible due process consequences of strict criminal liability, but 
noting that public welfare offenses do not necessarily need mens rea to satisfy constitutional due process concerns 
because regulation of those offenses is foreseeable). 
74
 Staples, 511 U.S. at 607. 
75
 Id. at 611–14, 622, 624. In addition to holding that guns are not dangerous enough to anticipate their regulation, 
the Court surprisingly suggested that cars could be termed “dangerous” devices. Id. at 614. While a car is every bit 
as deadly as an automatic weapon, a car is not designed for the purpose of causing harm. More to the point, the 
reason that guns were deemed not to trigger the expectation of regulation was in large part because they are so 
common, though certainly they are far less common than cars. Id. at 613–14 (“Roughly 50 percent of American 
homes contain at least one firearm of some sort . . . .”); Robin Chase, You Asked: Does Everyone in America Own a 
Car, AMERICA.GOV ARCHIVE, Mar. 19, 2010, http://www.america.gov/st/peopleplace-
english/2010/March/20100316154329fsyelkaew0.8109356.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2012) (stating that 95% of 
households own a car).  
76
 See, e.g., Staples, 511 U.S. at 624, 631 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding guns dangerous and noting surprise at the 
Court’s likening of guns more to food stamps than to hand grenades); Susan F. Mandiberg, The Dilemma of Mental 
State in Federal Regulatory Crimes: The Environmental Example, 25 ENVTL. L. 1165, 1202–03 (1995) (referring to 
the Court’s reasoning as “a radical departure from prior cases”); Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the 
Fairness of Notice: Confronting “Apparent Innocence” in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 4, 25–26 
(1995) (noting the contextual nature of innocuousness, the differing views of the Justices on the innocence of guns, 
and the general controversy regarding the “social significance of gun ownership”). 
77
 Staples, 511 U.S. at 617–19. 
78
 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841–5849 (2006).  
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those convicted without proof of mens rea—treating this as an indication of legislative intent to 
require mens rea, rather than as a due process violation, so the statute was not invalidated.
79
 
These limiting cases are about determining whether strict liability is permissible, and not 
how it is applied once it is determined to be the standard. Thus, they cease to be relevant once 
courts have agreed that a statute does, in fact, apply strict liability. Once it has been determined 
that the context is appropriate for strict liability, that the seriousness of punishment is acceptable, 
and that strict criminal liability was the intent of the legislature, all that remains is the case-by-
case question of whether the harm was within the control of the defendant. 
E. Foreseeability Has Limited Application to Strict Liability 
Strict criminal liability is not limited to harms that were foreseeable. Indeed, it is quite 
common among scholars, when arguing that a particular law does not impose strict liability, to 
use as evidence of this point the fact that it hinges on foreseeability of the relevant harm.
80
 This 
foreseeability requirement before imposing guilt is what distinguishes the given law from those 
imposing strict criminal liability. When we call something foreseeable, we are saying that it 
could or should have been foreseen, which is logically indistinguishable from the “should have 
known” standard, which is the test for negligence.81 Instead, “the premise of strict liability is that 
the defendant is held guilty no matter how careful and morally innocent he or she . . . has 
been.”82 
                                                 
79
 Staples, 511 U.S. at 615–16, 618–19, 635 n.20. 
80
 See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility Under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal 
Enterprise, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 109, 116 (2007) (noting that the fallibility of determining foreseeability can lead 
to a circumstance of strict liability); Peter J. Saghir, Home is Where the No-Fault Eviction Is: The Impact of the 
Drug War on Families in Public Housing, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 369, 394 (2003) (noting strict liability was employed 
when a court allowed an eviction despite the lack of foreseeability for events that violated relevant requirements); 
Kelley Elaine Lockman, Note, Who Brought the Kid?: United States v. McClain and the Application of Sentencing 
Enhancements When Use of a Minor in a Concerted Criminal Activity Was Foreseeable, 36 GA. L. REV. 863, 893 
(2002) (explaining that under the Pinkerton rule of liability for acts of a co-conspirator, the requirement of 
foreseeability avoids making it a rule of strict liability). 
81
 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 3 cmt. g (2010) (“Foreseeability often relates to practical considerations 
concerning the actor’s ability to anticipate future events or to understand dangerous conditions that already exist. In 
such cases, what is foreseeable concerns what the actor ‘should have known.’”). 
82
 Singer, supra note 17, at 356. 
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Some courts have erroneously taken foreseeability into account in the context of strict 
liability by couching it in terms of proximate causation.
83
 While lack of proximate causation can 
indeed be a defense to strict liability, this is so only to the extent that it negates the actus reus.
84
 
It is a fallacy to view it as an aspect of the mens rea, such that foreseeability considerations are 
broadly permissible, as there is no mens rea in strict liability crimes. The manner in which lack 
of foreseeability can eliminate proximate causation and aid in a criminal defendant’s case is 
where there is some superseding intervening cause of the harm,
85
 such as when the defendant 
displayed the required document on his car and it was removed by another in his absence,
86
 or 
where some malicious criminal has tampered with the end product on its way to consumers.
87
 
The proximate causation defense, however, “has limited use for strict liability crimes. If a 
defendant is directly involved in the prohibited action, the defense is unavailable.”88 
While foreseeability issues can arise in determining proximate causation, they have 
traditionally been limited in scope. Proximate causation is largely the absence of a superseding 
intervening cause.
89
 Not all intervening causes are superseding causes, and only the latter break 
the proximate causation.
90
 First, we look to whether the intervening cause is responsive—in that 
it was brought on by the defendant’s actions—or purely coincidental.91 If the former, that is 
generally the end of the inquiry—absent very unusual circumstances—it is not a superseding 
                                                 
83
 See infra Part IV. 
84
 Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 401, 430–32 
(1993). 
85
 See Blaize v. United States, 21 A.3d 78, 81 (D.C. 2011) (“Our cases establish that ‘[a]n intervening cause will be 
considered a superseding legal cause that exonerates the original actor if it was so unforeseeable that the 
actor’s . . . conduct, though still a substantial causative factor, should not result in the actor’s liability.’” (quoting 
Butts v. United States, 822 A.2d 407, 418 (D.C. 2003)) (alteration in original)). 
86
 See Kilbride v Lake [1962] NZLR 590 (SC) 590, 593 (presenting such a quintessential example that, even though 
a New Zealand case, it is commonly taught and cited in the United States and elsewhere). 
87
 For example, pain relievers have been tampered with on multiple occasions. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def., Crisis 
Communication Strategies: Analysis: Case Study: The Johnson & Johnson Tylenol Crisis, 
http://www.ou.edu/deptcomm/dodjcc/groups/02C2/Johnson%20&%20Johnson.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2012).  
88
 Levenson, supra note 84, at 432. 
89
 See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 440–441 (1965). 
90
 See id. 
91
 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 204–05 (4th ed. 2006) 
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cause and the defendant has proximately caused the end result.
92
 If it is purely coincidental, then 
and only then do we begin to consider foreseeability of the intervening cause to determine 
whether it is a superseding cause relieving the defendant of responsibility for the resulting 
harm.
93
 As discussed in People v. Rideout:
94
 
For a defendant’s conduct to be regarded as a proximate cause, the victim’s injury 
must be a “direct and natural result” of the defendant’s actions. In making this 
determination, it is necessary to examine whether there was an intervening cause 
that superseded the defendant’s conduct such that the causal link between the 
defendant’s conduct and the victim’s injury was broken. If an intervening cause 
did indeed supersede the defendant’s act as a legally significant causal factor, 
then the defendant’s conduct will not be deemed a proximate cause of the victim’s 
injury.
95
 
According to Professor Dressler’s treatise, a responsive intervening cause will typically 
not relieve the defendant of liability, while a coincidental intervening cause will typically relieve 
the defendant of liability unless foreseeability of the intervention can be established.
96
 In 
discussing responsive intervening causes, Professor Dressler suggests two examples: first, a boat 
passenger drowning while attempting to swim to shore after the boat capsizes, and second, a 
victim, wounded by a defendant, who dies after being treated negligently by medical 
professionals.
97
 In cases of responsive intervening causes, the harm at issue comes from actions 
taken in response to the defendant’s conduct.98 A coincidental intervening cause, on the other 
hand, might be as little as the defendant putting the victim “in the wrong place at the wrong 
time,” such as if the wounded victim in Professor Dressler’s example above is attacked by a 
“knife-wielding maniac” while waiting in the emergency room for treatment.99 
                                                 
92
 Id. at 204 (“Generally speaking, a responsive intervening cause does not relieve the initial wrongdoer of criminal 
responsibility, unless the response was not only unforeseeable, but highly abnormal or bizarre.”). 
93
 Id. at 206. 
94
 727 N.W.2d 630 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006), rev’d in part, 728 N.W.2d 459 (Mich. 2007). 
95
 Id. at 633 (quoting People v. Schaefer, 703 N.W.2d 774, 785 (Mich. 2005)). 
96
 DRESSLER, supra note 91, at 204, 206. 
97
 Id. at 204. 
98
 Id. 
99
 Id. at 205–06.  
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In the end, proximate causation “is a legal construct designed to prevent criminal liability 
from attaching when the result of the defendant’s conduct is viewed as too remote or unnatural. 
Thus, a proximate cause is simply a factual cause of which the law will take cognizance.”100 
Relieving defendants of liability for lack of proximate causation is thus reserved for truly special 
circumstances, in which what has occurred is highly unusual, not logically related to the 
defendant’s actions, and not likely to occur again if the defendant continues with the same 
behavior. 
Even where foreseeability does become relevant, it does not necessarily mean foreseeable 
to the ordinary person. Given that the trend toward strict liability offenses has primarily been in 
the context of public welfare concerns brought on by the Industrial Revolution,
101
 there must 
certainly be a subjective component to the objective question. In other words, while the ordinary 
person may not foresee that tightly sealed drums containing toxic waste might degrade and leach 
the waste into the ground, a person in the business of creating or storing such waste should find 
this foreseeable. If we were to inject a foreseeable-to-all requirement into public welfare strict 
liability offenses, there would be no such thing as strict liability. The entire point of the existence 
of public welfare strict liability offenses is that the defendants are in a special position to prevent 
a harm that the average person would know nothing about. 
F. Strict Liability in the Environmental Context 
Although strict liability always requires less culpability than negligence, regardless of 
context, it is generally especially strict and fault-free in the environmental context. Some 
scholars have suggested that, just as there are gradations of mens rea, there are also gradations, 
or at least one split-point, to strict liability.
102
 One example of this is the distinction between 
                                                 
100
 Rideout, 727 N.W.2d at 632 (quoting People v. Schaefer, 703 N.W.2d 774, 785 (Mich. 2005)) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
101
 See Levenson, supra note 84, at 419; see also Manchester, supra note 26, at 279–80, 282. 
102
 A common example is to divide strict liability into public welfare offenses and morality offenses. See, e.g., 
Levenson, supra note 84, at 418. Environmental crimes, of course, fall into the former category. See Andrew J. 
Turner, Mens Rea in Environmental Crime Prosecutions: Ignorantia Juris and the White Collar Criminal, 23 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 217, 220–21 (1998) (noting federal appellate courts’ treatment of violations under several 
environmental statutes as constituting public welfare offenses). 
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“pure” and “impure” strict liability.103 As Professor Simons describes it, pure strict liability 
requires absolutely no culpability as to any material element of the offense, whereas impure strict 
liability requires culpability as to at least one material element but does not require culpability as 
to at least one other element, at least in the sense of some intentional act.
104
 The examples he 
chose for each are useful. Statutory rape is an example of impure strict liability, in that one must 
intentionally engage in sexual intercourse, though it is not necessary to be aware of—or even 
negligent as to—the other participant’s age.105 The example he chose as the quintessential pure 
strict liability category of crime was environmental crime, “inasmuch as the offender need only 
cause defined forms of environmental risks or harms (such as exposing the public to certain 
pollutants or toxins in excess of a specified level), and it is irrelevant that she lacked negligence, 
knowledge, or any other culpability in causing those risks or harms.”106 
Environmental crime follows in the footsteps of a long line of strict liability crimes 
applicable to corporate officers.
107
 Generally referred to as “public welfare offenses,” this line of 
strict liability crimes developed in response to concerns regarding the dangers brought about by 
the Industrial Revolution.
108
 Progress has a dark side, in that it leads to activities, such as those 
directed at harnessing natural resources or those enabling mass production and distribution of 
products, that intrude on the natural state of being and create previously nonexistent dangers. 
These dangers may be directly to human beings, or to wildlife, or indirectly to both by harming 
the environment we share. These concerns are so great, and the decision to involve oneself in 
such enterprises so forward, that strict liability has been morally and constitutionally accepted in 
                                                 
103
 Simons, supra note 64, at 1081.  
104
 Id. 
105
 Id. at 1081–82. 
106
 Id. at 1082. 
107
 See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 278, 280–85 (1943) (applying a strict liability standard to 
the conviction of a corporate officer for shipping adulterated and misbranded drugs in violation of the Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006)). 
108
  See Levenson, supra note 84, at 419. 
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such contexts.
109
 The development of these strict liability public welfare offenses reflected a 
“shift of emphasis from the protection of individual interests” to the “protection of public and 
social interests.”110 The use of strict liability in these contexts places full responsibility for 
dangers—whether known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen—in the hands of the only people 
in a position to prevent the harm.
111
 
Of course, the use of a negligence standard generally shifts responsibility for risks to 
those in authority as well, but  
[O]nly under strict liability are individuals imprisoned even if they take all 
possible precautions to act reasonably. The sole question for the trier of fact is 
whether the defendant committed the proscribed act. The jury may not decide 
whether the defendant could have done anything else to prevent the unlawful 
act.
112
  
One good reason for this method of placing risk responsibility on the shoulders of those in 
control of major industrial activities is that it would be extremely difficult for jurors—or even 
courts—to properly assess what should qualify as reasonable care in such complex or 
extraordinary circumstances.
113
 Not only might jurors attempting to apply a negligence standard 
lead to “inconsistent, unpredictable, and biased” verdicts in these contexts, but there is also a 
significant risk that commonly shared views on appropriate standards of care may vary from one 
community to the next.
114
 
Strict liability in these contexts also has nearly the same moral force as a negligence 
standard would.
 115
 Underlying the standard is a presumption that nearly all who are convicted 
                                                 
109
 See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259, 281–82 (1976); 
infra notes 110–19 and accompanying text. 
110
 Francis Bowes Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 67 (1933). 
111
 See Levenson, supra note 84, at 419. 
112
 Id. at 420 (footnotes omitted). 
113
 See id. at 421. 
114
 Mark Kelman, Strict Liability: An Unorthodox View, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1512, 1517 
(Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983); see also Levenson, supra note 84, at 421. 
115
 The California Supreme Court stated the need for strict liability offenses as follows: 
 
There are many acts that are so destructive of the social order, or where the ability of the state to 
establish the element of criminal intent would be so extremely difficult if not impossible of proof, 
that in the interest of justice the legislature has provided that the doing of the act constitutes a 
crime, regardless of knowledge or criminal intent on the part of the defendant.  
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thereby were in fact negligent, but proof of such negligence is difficult and unreliable.
116
 To the 
extent that a few wholly innocent defendants are punished, this result is deemed outweighed by 
the significant harms such offenses generally are targeted to avoid, also taking into account the 
typically light punishments in the balance.
117
 In this sense, choosing to impose strict liability is a 
legislature’s way of expressing that this is a danger we take very seriously and wish to avoid at 
all costs.
118
 Beware to those who engage in large-scale or otherwise risky activities. 
Ultimately, when it comes to public welfare offenses, we are simply willing to take the 
risk of punishing some nonnegligent actors in order to ensure the greatest possible avoidance of a 
particularly disconcerting danger. 
The rationale of the doctrine of strict criminal liability is that, although 
criminal sanctions are relied upon, the primary purpose of the statutes is 
regulation rather than punishment or correction, and that the interest of 
enforcement for the public health and safety requires the risk that an occasional 
non-offender may be punished in order to prevent the escape of a greater number 
of culpable offenders.
119
 
This, of course, is the opposite of the usual philosophy of American criminal law, that we should 
allow many guilty people to go free before convicting even one innocent person, which 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
In these cases it is the duty of the defendant to know what the facts are. 
 
Ex parte Marley, 175 P.2d 832, 835 (Cal. 1946) (en banc) (quoting State v. Weisberg, 55 N.E.2d 870, 872 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1943)). 
116
 See, e.g., Levenson, supra note 84, at 421 (“A [] justification often offered for the strict liability doctrine is that it 
eases the burden on the prosecution to prove intent in difficult cases. . . . As with most irrebuttable presumptions, the 
legislature believes individual inquiries are unnecessary because the overwhelming majority of cases will show that 
the defendant acted at least negligently.” (footnotes omitted)); Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger, 
Presumptions, Assumptions, and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE L.J. 165, 173–
74 (1969) (discussing the burden of introducing evidence imposed by presumptions).  
117
 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 256 (1952) (noting that penalties for public welfare offenses 
“commonly are relatively small”); see, e.g., Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A 
Normative Analysis, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 579, 597, 600–01 (1993) (recognizing that CERCLA’s strict 
liability provisions impose liability on “factually responsible” parties as a matter of fairness—even where the 
charged parties are blameless—in order to deter harmful conduct). 
118
  
By labeling an offense as strict liability, the legislature can claim to provide the utmost protection 
from certain public harms. By affording no leniency for defendants causing harm, the legislature 
affirms society’s interest in being protected from certain conduct. In this sense, strict liability 
expresses emphatically that such conduct will not be tolerated regardless of the actor’s intent. 
 
Levenson, supra note 84, at 422. 
119
 People v. Travers, 124 Cal. Rptr. 728, 730 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975). 
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philosophy forms the basis for the “proof beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.120 But that is 
what distinguishes strict criminal liability offenses: they deal with matters so great, and impose 
punishment so minimal,
121
 that the balance has been shifted the other way. 
It is essential to note that, especially in the critical but not always universally appreciated 
area of environmental protection, strict criminal liability may indeed be the only means of getting 
corporate executives to take all possible precautions.
122
 The argument is that, given the corporate 
priority of profit maximization, mere corporate fines may simply be rolled into the cost of doing 
business, often being well worth the financial benefits derived from environmental sloppiness, 
such that corporate officers will not have adequate incentive to take every possible precaution.
123
 
Thus, exposing the corporate officers to criminal convictions, and the resulting punishments, is 
the only way to achieve complete vigilance. 
The quintessential discussion of the philosophy and moral justification for strict criminal 
liability is found in Morissette v. United States.
124
 The moral support for the strict liability 
standard comes from its development in relation to public welfare offenses—out of concern for 
the dangers created by the many new trades that sprung from the Industrial Revolution: 
Many of these offenses are not in the nature of positive aggressions or invasions, 
with which the common law so often dealt, but are in the nature of neglect where 
the law requires care, or inaction where it imposes a duty. Many violations of 
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 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, (1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt in criminal cases because, inter alia, “[i]t is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be 
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such regulations result in no direct or immediate injury to person or property but 
merely create the danger or probability of it which the law seeks to 
minimize. . . . Hence, legislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter of policy, 
does not specify intent as a necessary element. The accused, if he does not will 
the violation, usually is in a position to prevent it with no more care than society 
might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact 
from one who assumed his responsibilities.
125
 
For this reason the Court held that, while it supported strict criminal liability in this regulatory 
context, it would not apply it to traditional common law crimes based on moral culpability—
larceny, in that case.
126
 Environmental crimes are the direct descendants of the original 
development of regulatory public welfare offenses. Environmental harm is generally caused, 
whether knowingly or not, by those who are “in a position to prevent it with no more care than 
society might reasonably expect and no more exertion than it might reasonably exact from one 
who assumed his responsibilities.”127 
IV. THE LATEST APPELLATE CASE TO ADDRESS MBTA LIABILITY 
The Supreme Court has yet to address the standard for criminal liability under the 
MBTA. Indeed, a Westlaw search reveals that the Court has only so much as mentioned the 
statute a handful of times. Thus, advocates have been forced to develop the area in lower courts, 
mostly at the trial court level. Of the handful of appellate cases discussing the application of the 
strict liability standard under the MBTA, only two deal with the most essential modern area of 
enforcement: an industrial setting resulting in indirect harm—as opposed to the hunting context, 
which is not the focus of this Article. The first is United States v. FMC Corp.,
128
 a well-known 
case for upholding strict liability under the MBTA as against a defendant who was not aware of 
the “lethal-to-birds quality” of his runoff ponds.129 The FMC Court handled the issue of the 
MBTA’s theoretically broad reach by entrusting it to disciplined use of prosecutorial 
discretion.
130
 While this case has been highly regarded and often cited—after all, until last year it 
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 Id. at 253–56. 
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 Id. at 260, 262. 
127
 Id. at 256 (discussing public welfare offenses generally). 
128
 572 F. Supp. 2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978). 
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 Id. at 903, 908.  
130
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was the only appellate case on the matter—it is also well over three decades old, and now we 
have a new appellate case to reckon with in this context. As the only appellate case since FMC to 
address the application of strict MBTA liability to industrial actors, or even to indirect harm in 
general, this latest case out of the Tenth Circuit requires some attention. 
United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc.
131
 involved two defendants, Apollo and Walker, 
both owners of oil drilling operations.
132
  These operations used numerous heater-treaters, 
devices with exhaust pipes that frequently entrap birds absent a simple protective screen, which 
was lacking in both defendants’ heater-treaters.133 After finding several hundred dead birds 
trapped in heater-treaters in the region—southeast Kansas—the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service 
(FWS) engaged in a public awareness campaign in the area regarding the heater-treater problem, 
sending letters to individual oil companies in the area, including Apollo, but not Walker.
134
 The 
campaign included posters, industry presentations, TV news stories, and an Associated Press 
story.
135
 As a matter of prosecutorial discretion, FWS chose not to recommend prosecution for 
the MBTA violations pre-dating the campaign—for the dead birds that prompted the 
campaign.
136
 
Apollo’s violation took place after it was directly notified of the issue by FWS during its 
campaign.
137
 Walker’s violations both took place after the informational campaign, but he did 
not receive a direct FWS letter until after his first violation—after which he still did nothing to 
screen his heater-treaters; the second violation was a year after the first and its corresponding 
letter.
138
 The lower court convicted on all counts, based on the applicable strict liability standard, 
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 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010). 
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 Id. at 682.  
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 Id. at 682, 685, 691 (noting both Apollo and Walker failed to bird-proof their heater-treaters). 
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 Id. at 682, 683 & n.2.  
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 Id. at 683. 
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 Id.  
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138
 Id. at 682, 683 & n.2, 685, 691 (noting that Walker had been urged by the FWS to secure his heater-treaters, but 
had failed to do so). 
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as the unscreened heater-treaters were within the defendants’ control.139 The Tenth Circuit 
upheld strict liability as the standard for liability, but held that strict liability only satisfies due 
process if the defendants proximately caused the proscribed harm.
140
 The convictions for both 
Apollo and Walker for the violations that took place after receipt of the letter were affirmed, but 
Walker’s conviction for the violation that took place well after the campaign but before his own 
letter—which was prompted by this violation—was reversed for lack of proximate causation.141 
In spite of the court’s stated approval of strict liability for MBTA misdemeanors, 
Walker’s testimony that he did not know about the heater-treater problem prior to his first 
violation
142
 was the basis for the court’s reversal of that count.143 The district court had found 
proximate causation to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt because trapped birds were a direct 
consequence of failing to screen the access holes to the heater-treater.
144
 The defendant’s lack of 
knowledge was not part of the equation in the lower court, as it was applying a strict liability 
standard.
145
 
The Tenth Circuit, however, based its determination of whether the defendants 
proximately caused the bird deaths on “what knowledge the defendants had or should have had 
of birds potentially dying in their heater-treaters.”146 This language evokes a “knew or should 
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have known” standard, which is not appropriate in a strict liability context.147 If such 
knowledge—that a defendant had or should have had—were required, the standard would be one 
of at least negligence. To make matters worse, the lower court made findings of fact that “birds 
trapped in heater/treaters [were] relatively common in the industry,” and that “oil operators have 
been aware for some time that bird remains are frequently found in heater/treaters.”148 The Tenth 
Circuit simply disagreed with the lower court on these findings of fact.
149
 Given that dead birds 
were found in both defendants’ heater-treaters on every FWS inspection,150 it is hard to believe 
that the concept of bird attraction to these devices was entirely new to them. Nevertheless, in the 
context of strict liability public welfare offenses, the fact that the bird deaths were common 
should not have mattered. Where the commonality of the problem is relevant, however, is in the 
sense that it completely rules out the notion that it was such an absurd result as to wipe out 
proximate causation.
151
 Indeed, there was not even any intervening cause at all, neither 
responsive nor coincidental—the defendants’ actions directly caused the harm. 
The Apollo Energies court apparently derived its foreseeability analysis, requiring 
knowledge of the dangers posed by heater-treaters, from the due process concept of “notice” 
requirements.
152
 It placed great focus on Lambert v. California,
153
 in which the Supreme Court 
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 355 U.S. 225 (1957). 
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held that due process required notice “where a person, wholly passive and unaware of any 
wrongdoing,” fails to affirmatively act as the law requires, and is criminally liable for that 
failure.
154
 Lambert involved a requirement to register as a felon if present in the state, where such 
presence was not an activity likely to trigger an expectation of regulation absent notice, which 
the Supreme Court expressly distinguished from other public welfare offenses where people are 
involved in potentially harmful activities.
155
 The Apollo Energies court analogized the need for 
notice in Lambert to the FWS notice of the heater-treater problem, such that only those who had 
received the FWS letters had adequate notice to support due process, which the court called an 
indistinguishable issue from that of proximate causation.
156
 
This MBTA case bears absolutely no resemblance to Lambert. One cannot credibly 
define the operation of an oil rig as “wholly passive.”157 As discussed in Part III.D, the Supreme 
Court has held that in the context of activities that a reasonable person would expect might be 
regulated, such as those with the potential to cause harm, strict criminal liability is 
constitutional.
158
 The Court has spoken clearly regarding the importance of activities one might 
expect to be regulated, but has said nothing about the ability to predict the specific factual 
harm—as this suggests a “knew or should have known” standard and would not be strict liability. 
In a time and place where there are numerous environmental restrictions on industrial activities, 
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in place for nearly four decades
159
 at the times relevant to Apollo Energies, there can be no doubt 
that a reasonable person would expect regulation of the activity of operating an oil rig. To 
describe such a party as “wholly passive” and without notice of the potential for regulation 
offends reason.
160
 Lambert lacked actus reus, but in the environmental context, the actus reus is 
the operation of the plant that causes the harm.
161
 A requirement that the operator knows of the 
specific harm itself would be about mens rea, and thus would go beyond the mere actus reus 
requirement of a strict liability offense.
162
 
The Apollo Energies court took the expectation that parties be on notice of the potential 
for regulation of their activities and twisted it into a requirement that the government provide 
individualized written notice of each particular risk of harm in order to hold the parties 
responsible for that harm.
163
 In unprecedented fashion, the court suggests the government must 
track down every potential violator, in advance of their violation, and then affirmatively and 
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individually warn them not to commit the violation—a requirement that would be impossible for 
agencies to meet. 
This approach also counters decades of preceding cases. In addition to those already 
discussed above,
164
 in the 1990s three district court cases found mine operators strictly liable 
under the MBTA for the deaths of migratory birds that were drawn to ponds of water laced with 
cyanide as a result of the leaching processes involved in mining for precious metals.
165
 In these 
cases the miners had no idea these ponds were attracting and killing migratory birds, but much 
like Apollo’s and Walker’s heater-treaters (at least as the lower court held), they were 
responsible for the dangerous-to-birds attraction whether they knew birds were drawn to it or 
not.  Around the same time, Exxon Corporation and Exxon Shipping Company were held strictly 
criminally liable for migratory bird deaths that resulted from an accidental oil spill that followed 
a shipping disaster.
166
 
Arguably the most similar case to Apollo Energies is United States v. Moon Lake Electric 
Ass’n (Moon Lake).167 Moon Lake involved migratory bird deaths resulting from electrocution by 
the defendant’s electric power poles.168 Just as birds had always been drawn to heater-treaters 
and then trapped inside, birds had historically died from such pole and power line 
electrocutions.
169
 Likewise, just as the heater-treater problem was easily resolved with screens, 
the electric poles could have been rendered safer via the installation of inexpensive equipment.
170
 
It was the failure to install such equipment that resulted in the defendant’s charges in both Moon 
Lake and the lower court in Apollo Energies. The Moon Lake court based its analysis for finding 
proximate cause on differentiating the defendant’s activities from those that everyday ordinary 
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individuals engage in, which may at some point result in the death of a migratory bird.
171
 The 
special operations involved had a probable consequence of resulting in bird deaths.
172
  
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit opinion in Apollo Energies does not merely reverse the holding 
below, it runs counter to nearly all lower court opinions on this issue to date, as well as the only 
prior appellate opinion on the topic.
173
 
Another line of cases, decided before the MBTA was amended to require mens rea, 
applied strict liability for the offense of hunting over bait; these cases nearly unanimously held 
that hunters did not have to know an area was baited to be held criminally liable.
174
 Applying the 
reasoning of Apollo Energies to these cases would limit criminal liability to those who had been 
directly warned that an area was baited, a limitation no court previously required. One case that 
applied a “knew or should have known standard,”175 was widely criticized176 and was later 
indirectly overruled.
177
 Of course, as a result of legislative amendment, “knew or should have 
known” is now the standard the MBTA expressly applies to hunting over bait. 
Appellate courts that have previously addressed the constitutionality of the MBTA’s 
strict liability provision have held that it does not offend the requirements of due process.
178
 As 
the Seventh Circuit noted: 
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The late Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes once pointed out the distinction between 
criminal and non-criminal intent: “Even a dog distinguishes between being 
stumbled over and being kicked.” In strict liability cases, like this one, both 
stumbling over and kicking a dog result in criminal liability.
179
 
The point is clear: strict liability is liability without fault. 
If the MBTA is to maintain its strict liability standard as it continues its progression into 
the world of environmental restrictions on industrial behavior, the reasoning of Apollo Energies 
simply cannot be accepted. Its current status as the latest and nearly exclusive appellate position 
on the issue renders it particularly dangerous. At some point the Supreme Court will need to 
weigh in on this issue. In the meantime, some proposals are offered in the next Part for 
restructuring our regulatory and enforcement scheme to create a morally defensible master plan. 
Not all courts are willing to place their trust in prosecutorial discretion where a statute has such 
sweeping potential to criminalize everyday living—having windows, non-negligent driving of a 
motor vehicle, etc.
180—so prosecutorial policy must be expressed clearly in advance. 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE MBTA’S ENFORCEMENT FUTURE 
It has been posited that “[t]he MBTA in many ways acts as a skeleton upon which the 
implementing regulations necessarily place the flesh.”181 The MBTA completely outlaws taking, 
killing, or possessing migratory birds “at any time, by any means or in any manner,”182 applying 
strict criminal liability for misdemeanor violations,
183
 but then states that the Secretary of the 
Interior is: 
[A]uthorized and directed . . . to determine when, to what extent, if at all, and by 
what means, it is compatible with the terms of the conventions to allow hunting, 
taking, capture, killing, possession, sale, purchase, shipment, transportation, 
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carriage, or export of any such bird, or any part, nest, or egg thereof, and to adopt 
suitable regulations permitting and governing the same.
184
 
In other words, Congress made a sweeping prohibition that would be unrealistic to enforce—a 
prohibition that could, at some point, touch nearly everyone’s activities—and then asked the 
Secretary to carve out an enforceable plan. 
If the government hopes to escape the inappropriate and impractical limitation on strict 
liability imposed by Apollo Energies, it must develop limiting regulations or written enforcement 
policies that address the concerns courts have regarding the potential over-inclusiveness of the 
MBTA. By properly limiting its reach and protecting truly passive or ordinary individuals 
expressly, and not just with its own case-by-case prosecutorial discretion, the government—the 
Departments of the Interior and Justice—can prevent the kind of bad law created by Apollo 
Energies. Such an express policy might even obtain a supportive constitutional or interpretive 
holding in the highest court, should it take on the matter. 
Even the FMC court, which upheld the application of strict liability to corporate actors in 
the industrial context, expressed some reservations: 
Certainly construction that would bring every killing within the statute, such as 
deaths caused by automobiles, airplanes, plate glass modern office buildings or 
picture windows in residential dwellings into which birds fly, would offend 
reason and common sense. . . . Such situations properly can be left to the sound 
discretion of prosecutors and the courts.
185
 
This makes sense in relation to the due process justification for applying strict liability at all: the 
defendant is engaged in an activity that he might reasonably expect to be regulated in some way. 
He need not know precisely how his actions are regulated—ignorance of the law is no defense. 
Nor must he know of the facts that result in a violation of the law—as this would be a mens rea 
requirement, which is absent under strict liability. To incur liability, a defendant must simply 
know that he is engaged in a sort of activity—over which he has authority—that the government 
may wish to regulate. 
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My question is this: why limit our effort to focus MBTA application on such individuals 
to case-by-case prosecutorial discretion? Doing so risks generating opinions, like Apollo 
Energies, which create broadly applicable bad law in either an effort to disagree with the 
prosecutorial choice in that instance, or perhaps out of general distrust of prosecutorial discretion 
in the context of an unbridled criminal statute such as the MBTA. The prosecution has no face-
saving regulation to point to, or even a fair and comprehensive written prosecutorial policy. 
Providing some structure, where there currently is little, may well save the day. 
We need limiting regulations that restrict the scope of MBTA prosecution to those 
engaged in industrial and commercial activity and those otherwise engaged in unusually 
hazardous—even if noncommercial—activities. This could then be bolstered by a prosecutorial 
policy that interprets the regulations to sufficiently limit the scope of potential defendants to 
those engaged in activities one might expect to be regulated, thus rendering a pure strict liability 
approach—without further foreseeability requirements—appropriate. Indeed, even if the 
Department of the Interior did only the latter, it could go a long way in achieving the goals I 
suggest, which are as follows: 
1. Provide a uniform system to determine which cases to prosecute 
within the government’s otherwise extremely broad authority; 
2. Ensure clear communication of these prosecutorial priorities 
between the Departments of the Interior and Justice; 
3. Create a written interpretation of the statute that saves it from 
potential constitutional weaknesses; 
4. Assure the courts that the government is cognizant of due process 
concerns inherent in the Act’s potential reach, perhaps preventing 
judges from feeling the need to carve out these limits via court 
opinions; and 
5. Place industrial actors and others involved in potentially 
hazardous-to-birds activities on notice that they are the 
prosecutorial targets of the Act, rendering it more likely that they 
will engage in the necessary due diligence to avoid a violation in 
the first place. 
If the Department of the Interior chooses to accomplish this task via regulation, it would 
be advantageous to frame it as an interpretation of the intended reach of the statute. There are 
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two reasons for this. First, such an interpretation, in the context of rulemaking, would be entitled 
to Chevron deference if challenged.
186
 Second, to the extent that Congress delegated the policy 
question of the criminal reach of the statute,
187
 a party who disagrees with the policies expressed 
in the regulations may attempt a nondelegation challenge. That said, even without expressing the 
regulatory choices as statutory interpretation, such a challenge would be weak; nondelegation 
challenges rarely succeed
188
 and issues with MBTA’s reach are arguably more about 
prosecutorial discretion than legislative policy. An additional upside to addressing this issue via 
notice and comment regulations is that the administrative discussion process will ensure wider 
dissemination of the new policies than would be likely via written policy alone. 
Should FWS choose not to address this issue through regulatory drafting and the 
corresponding full notice and comment rulemaking process, most of the goals I have listed can 
be accomplished—arguably all of them, albeit to a slightly diminished extent—via a written 
policy statement. Despite the fact that a policy statement would be entitled to a lower level of 
deference if challenged, I believe that a court would uphold the policies I propose as consistent 
with existing Supreme Court interpretations of the due process limits on strict liability in the 
environmental public welfare offense context. A discussion of this case law should be included 
in the written policy and presented as the basis for it. I would also recommend that the policy be 
drafted and issued jointly by the Department of the Interior—FWS—and the Department of 
Justice. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Given that the due process concerns associated with strict criminal liability are alleviated 
in the context of predictably regulated activities, and that such activities result in most of the 
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MBTA violations of concern for prosecution, it is time for the Department of the Interior to 
express its target more clearly in regulations or a written policy. Such a self-imposed limitation 
would help prevent overreaching limitations imposed by misguided court decisions, which can 
be quite damaging. Not only would such a policy have left room for the prosecutions in Apollo 
Energies, but it may have prevented the resulting reversal and corresponding bad law that could 
impact many prosecutions to come. 
